

CURRICULUM

PART II - FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

SYLLABUS FOR COURSE SIX

THE COMMUNIST BLOC

MONDAY, 3 JANUARY TO FRIDAY, 28 JANUARY

SECOND TENTATIVE DRAFT

THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE  
Washington 25, D. C.

10 November 1954

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This syllabus for Course Six, "The Communist Bloc" for the Academic Year 1954-1955 is hereby approved and promulgated for the guidance of the Staff, Faculty and Members of the Class at the National War College.

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Lieutenant General, U. S. Air Force  
Commandant

PART II - FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

COURSE SIX  
THE COMMUNIST BLOC

A - SCOPE OF COURSE

1. Introduction

a. Our course of study during the year to date, has led us from a general survey of the world today through consideration of the nature of international conflicts into a study of the military element of national power. Course Four added, by way of introduction to the bloc studies, a survey of the non-military components of national power and of some of the major elements -- geographical, economic, and political-- which make up components. In Course Five we considered and evaluated the strengths and weaknesses of the Free World Bloc both as absolutes and relative to the bloc's ability to withstand Communist pressures. The natural sequence of study now leads to a similar consideration and evaluation of the Communist Bloc. Because this encompasses the Soviet Union, its satellites and its junior partner, Communist China-- a vast and complex area relatively unfamiliar to most Americans, our treatment has to seek a satisfactory balance between the introduction of fundamentals and more sophisticated analyses and interpretations. The fact that Communism is a special and vital ingredient of contemporary Soviet and Chinese national power adds a further complexity with which Course Six must deal.

2. Purpose

The purpose of Course Six is to consider the economic, military, political, and social strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet Union, its satellites, and its partner, Communist China, in order to build up an

overall evaluation of the Communist capabilities and probable courses of action in continuing their drive toward world domination either by acts short of all-out war or by such war.

3. Subject Matter

a. Course Six, for clarity and convenience of study, divides the broad subject of The Communist Bloc into four elements, two of which are further sub-divided.

b. The first division is concerned with certain general characteristics of the Communist world. Its subdivisions are partly physical and partly topical--physical in the literal sense that one segment opens the course while the other segment concludes it; topical in that the first segment deals with the nature of the Communist movement while the second is the overall evaluation of capabilities and intentions.

c. The second division, also sub-divided, concentrates on the Union of Soviet Social Republics. Its first subdivision deals with basic background material; its second, with descriptive analyses of contemporary situations.

d. The third division, because of the pressure of time the shortest of all, reviews the current status of the Soviet satellites to determine their contributions to Soviet power.

e. Communist China is the object of our regard in the fourth part of the course. The course of Communism in China, its impact on the economy and on the military strength of China, its ambitions and its problems are all briefly reviewed.

4. Academic Procedures

a. Lectures and recommended readings will be as indicated in Section D, "Detailed Program." Additional books and articles for reading and reference are listed in the bibliography at the end of this syllabus.

b. There will be a committee problem. (See Section C.)

c. Discussion groups will meet every day except on the last two days of the course which are reserved for the committee presentations and seminars.

d. Oral presentations based on individual studies will be given throughout the course.

e. Several movies, pertinent to the immediate subject being studied, will be presented during the course. Attendance is voluntary.

B - ORGANIZATION OF THE COURSE4. Daily TopicsFirst WeekCOMMUNISM IN GENERAL, I

Mon 3 Jan The Nature of Contemporary Communism  
 Tue 4 Jan The Lure of Communism

THE USSR: BACKGROUNDS

Wed 5 Jan Soviet Lands and Peoples  
 Thu 6 Jan The "Monolithic" Government  
 Fri 7 Jan Soviet Planned Economy

Second WeekTHE USSR: CURRENT

Mon 10 Jan Soviet Economic Strengths and Weaknesses  
 Tue 11 Jan Soviet Scientific and Cultural Capabilities  
 Wed 12 Jan Soviet Military Capabilities I  
 Thu 13 Jan Soviet Military Capabilities II  
 Fri 14 Jan Soviet Strategic Concepts

Third WeekTHE SATELLITES

Mon 17 Jan Changes Since Stalin  
 Tue 18 Jan The Satellites Since Stalin  
 Wed 19 Jan Military and Economic Contributions of the Satellites

COMMUNIST CHINA

Thu 20 Jan The Growth of Communism in China  
 Fri 21 Jan The Economy of Communist China

Fourth Week

Mon 24 Jan	The Foreign Policies of Communist China
Tue 25 Jan	The Military Capabilities of Communist China

COMMUNISM IN GENERAL, II

Wed 26 Jan	Communist Strengths and Weaknesses
Thu 27 Jan	Committee Problem Presentations
Fri 28 Jan	Seminars

D - DETAILED PROGRAM

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FIRST DAY  
MONDAY, 3 JANUARY

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THE NATURE OF CONTEMPORARY COMMUNISM

1. Introduction

a. "Communism" once meant simply a social system in which property is held in common. Such systems were found among many primitive peoples (e. g., the Incas and the Germanic tribes), among some early Christian groups, and were described in the writings of Plato, More, Fourier, and many others. Despite various experiments in communistic living (such as the Oneida Community and Brook Farm, to mention American examples) which were inspired by philosophical theories, communism until a generation or so ago could properly be thought of as primarily a philosophical abstraction. This is no longer true even though there still exist various kinds of "philosophical communists."

b. Communism, as the word is used today, means Marxian Communism or, to give its more commonplace meaning, the system of government, economy, and society practiced in the Soviet Union, Communist China, and elsewhere. Since the system first was developed in and is still largely dominated by the Soviet Union there is sound reason for calling it "Soviet Communism."

c. The story of how a socio-economic theory, originally developed by two Germans living in England, was transplanted to Russia and transmuted into one of the great dynamics of our time is fascinating and important. Unfortunately, it lies largely beyond the scope of our study due to the pressures of time. In the process of transportation and transmutation,

many changes took place but certain basic concepts never changed. Among these were and are: the belief that the doctrines--the system of Marx-Lenin-Stalin as these are often called--contain the only key to social developments; the belief that social developments occur only through conflict; and the twin beliefs in the inevitable decay of capitalism and its replacement, through violent revolution, by Communism triumphant.

d. Contemporary Communism is more than a set of theories, and more than a mere cover behind which power-hungry men can operate. It has become a "guide to action" which affects, directly or inversely, nearly everyone in the world. Because Khrushchev<sup>"</sup>, Malenkov, and Company are the masters of this "guide" as well as the masters of Soviet and satellite national power, we begin our study of the Communist Bloc with a look at this movement which has properly been called a secular religion.

## 2. Scope of the Topic

a. Today we scan some of the highlights of fundamental Communist doctrines with special attention to their uses and applications as "guides to action" and as managerial techniques. A very hasty review of the early history of the system of Marx-Lenin-Stalin is also included in the topic.

## 3. Guide Lines of Discussion

a. Are Khrushchev<sup>"</sup>, Malenkov and Company "dedicated to our destruction?" If so, does this position stem from their current self-interest or from an ideological base?

b. Is it possible to distinguish between propagandistic appeals which Soviet leaders may be presumed not to believe and basic doctrines which it may be presumed they do believe?

c. Does the Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin system almost automatically beget intra-group conspiracy within the ranks of the leaders? If so, is this an exploitable weakness?

d. Does the Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin system require a monolithic state?

e. Is monolithism a strength or a weakness?

f. What can a study of the ideology of Soviet Communism contribute toward an understanding of our enemy?

#### 4. Lecture

The formal lecture for the day is entitled NOT A DOGMA BUT A GUIDE TO ACTION and will be delivered by Dr. Warren B. Walsh, Director of the Political Affairs Division, The National War College.

#### 5. Reading

- a. THE SOVIET'S MARXIST HERITAGE, by Warren B. Walsh, Chap. 9 from Great Issues, Brown, 1951, p. 161-180.
- b. A SPECTER IS HAUNTING EUROPE, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF COMMUNISM, and THE TACTICS OF COMMUNISM, Parts I - III from The Strategy and Tactics of World Communism, House Document No. 619, 80th Congress, 2nd Session, 1948, p. 1-50,
- c. TEN FALLACIES ABOUT COMMUNISM by William Henry Chamberlin, The Russian Review, Vol. 12, No. 3 (July, 1953) pp. 139-152.

SECOND DAY  
TUESDAY, 4 JANUARY

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THE LURE OF COMMUNISM

1. Introduction

a. To meet successfully the challenges of contemporary Communism we must know what attracts free men and women toward and into the movement. According to recent (July, 1954) Soviet boasts there are approximately 21,000,000 members of the Communist Party in the USSR, its satellites and Red China and about 9,000,000 more outside these countries. The last figure is probably exaggerated but, to balance that, it does not include the tens of millions of fellow-travelers, party-liners, crypto-Communists, or dupes who are found wherever the Party is found (and sometimes where it isn't).

b. These 9,000,000 members plus their many millions of associates, affiliates, and stooges all owe and give their primary allegiance to Moscow. This has added a new power tool and a new dimension to politics and international relations. It explains why we face not only Frenchmen who act like Frenchmen, which is sometimes hard enough for Americans to appreciate, but also some Frenchmen--800,000 according to the Kremlin--who behave not like Frenchmen but like Russians. But this is an explanation that does not satisfy. Why did these people become the devoted adherents of the system which was described yesterday? This question is relatively easy to answer if asked about Communist countries because the advantages of being part of the ruling elite are obvious. But why do people in other circumstances--specifically why do men and women who presumably have real freedom of choice, choose Communism?

c. There are no pat answers to that question--or none that are valid at

least. We shall not find the answers, either, but the quest will add to our understanding of the nature of the enemy. If we hope to keep people away from the enemy, it is obvious that we better find out all we can about what attracts people to the enemy.

## 2. Scope of Topic

A combination of circumstances--lack of time, incomplete knowledge, the complexity of the subject--dictates that we limit our study mostly to those persons in free countries who are lured into the Communist Parties.

## 3. Guide Lines of Discussion

a. We hear about "belly Communism"--that is, about the appeals which Communism holds for the physically hungry or otherwise underprivileged. Is this an accurate analysis? Is it an adequate analysis?

b. Does the Free World offer or can it offer any "guide to action" comparable to that laid down by the Communists?

c. Can the Free World offer and does it offer, answers to the common emotional hungers which Communism exploits?

d. How would you try to dissuade a person from joining the Communist Party?

e. How would you try to help a person to free himself from his ties with the Party?

4. Lecture: The formal lecture for the day is entitled WHY DO THEY CHOOSE COMMUNISM and will be delivered by Dr. Warren B. Walsh.

## 5. Reading

a. COMMUNISM, SOCIAL CLASSES AND POWER, by Seton-Watson, Chap. 16  
From Lenin to Malenkov, 1953, p. 330-356.

b. WHY THEY BECOME COMMUNISTS, by Janeway, in New York Times Magazine  
June 14, 1953, starting on p. 13.

- c. THE APPEAL OF COMMUNISM, by Fred C. Bruhns, Pacific Spectator,  
Vol. 6, No. 4 (1952) pp. 413-427.

6. Movies

The film, "SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY", featuring Mr. George Kennan and students of the NWC, will be shown. Attendance is voluntary.

THIRD DAY  
WEDNESDAY, 5 JANUARY

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SOVIET LANDS AND PEOPLES

1. Introduction

a. We have been regarding the system which dominates the lives of hundreds of millions of persons throughout the world. Now it is time to look at the USSR, chief power center of Communism and, by that token, chief enemy of all free men and nations, especially ourselves. Today we begin that look (and open the second part of the course) by glancing, so-to-speak, at the stage setting and some of the actors.

b. Both have some inherent interest, but our concern with them is more purposeful than mere curiosity. We are interested in the Soviet lands and peoples partly because an acquaintance with them gives a reality and a substance to our study. The enemy of whom we spoke a moment ago is human and not theoretical. He occupies space and derives his power--which is real indeed--partially from the resources of that space. We can visualize him better if we know a little about that space. And we can judge better the power (as well as some of the problems) of the masters of the USSR if we know something about the geographical and human elements involved.

c. The purpose of today's topic, to state it even more explicitly, is to survey the Soviet lands and the Soviet peoples as elements of Soviet national power. Since both lands and peoples are relatively strange to us, the survey will have to be sweeping and must begin with certain fundamentals of an introductory character. On this foundation can be built our estimates of strengths and weaknesses.

## 2. Scope of Topic

We depend upon brief readings, supplemented by discussion and visual aids, to sketch the face of the Soviet land. Our attention is concentrated on people as a major element in Soviet national power.

## 3. Guide Lines of Discussion

a. What are the implications of the predominant age groups of the Soviet population in terms of military manpower?

b. What are the implications of the predominant age groups of the Soviet population in terms of industrial manpower?

c. What are the implications of the predominant age group of the Soviet population in terms of political reliability and tractability?

d. What is the situation of the following minorities in the USSR: religious, racial, national, social, political, economic?

e. What enduring patterns of mass beliefs and behaviors are found among the Soviet peoples? Are these elements of strength or of weakness to the national power?

f. What significant population movements have taken place within the Soviet Union?

## 4. Lecture

The formal lecture for the day is entitled THE SOVIET PEOPLE AND SOVIET NATIONAL POWER and will be delivered by

## 5. Reading

a. THE RESOURCE BACKGROUND, Schwartz, Chap 1 from Russia's Soviet Economy, 1950 (rev. ed., 1954) p. 1-33.

b. THE SOVIET MAN -- PORTRAIT OF A MYSTERY, by Frederick C. Barghoorn, in The New York Times Magazine for 3 May, 1953, p. 9 & ff.

c. THE SOVIET MAN, by Andrew M. Denny in The Military Engineer, Vols. 43-44, No. 297 (1952) pp. 32-36.

- d. SOVIET SOCIETY; FROM THE DACHA SET DOWN, Fortune Magazine,  
February 1953, pp. 125 & ff.

6. Movies

The Soviet film, "14th August," will be shown. This is a highly glamorized, propaganda view of the USSR but it gives some notion of the vastness and contrasts of the Soviet lands. Attendance is voluntary.

FOURTH DAY  
THURSDAY, 6 JANUARY

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THE "MONOLITHIC" GOVERNMENT

1. Introduction

a. It is a standard and proven assumption that government is one major component of a nation's total power. We have explored this assumption in general terms in Course IV and in specific terms in other courses. Today we shall use an examination of the Soviet government as one of the measuring sticks of Soviet power. As in other aspects of our study of the USSR it is necessary to combine some introductory fundamentals with more sophisticated analyses.

b. It would be an enormous task under optimum conditions to govern 213,000,000 persons. The task becomes staggering when these millions are widely separated physically and of varying backgrounds, local interests, and levels. Complexities and problems are greatly increased when the system requires that a very high degree of centralized control be exercised over all aspects of the lives and activities of so many millions of people. This is precisely what the Soviet system does require and the Soviet people are, of course, widely scattered and of diverse characters. A study of how the ten men who rule the USSR make their will felt throughout the length and breadth of the USSR, of what problems have been encountered, of which problems have been solved and which remain unsolved, will aid in evaluating the power these men control.

c. Government in the USSR has two faces--the Communist Party and the formal government apparatus. These are two sides of one coin, and the coin is controlled by the ten men--Khrushchev, Malenkov, Molotov, Bulganin, Zhukov,

et, alii---who make up the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. These men usually manage to present a monolithic facade to the world. Equally important in terms of monolithism, all activities and all controls--social, political, economic, and psychological--are under the Presidium's domination.

d. The calculated use of force and terror is one of their instruments of control, but it is only one and it is easy to exaggerate it partly because its existence and use are anathemas to free men. Not all Soviet citizens, however, have to be forced or terrorized into working for their government. Many are loyal from conviction and/or self-interest. Suasion, indoctrination, and non-violent techniques of control are also very important tools of the Presidium.

## 2. Scope of Topic

Excluding all but a quick glance at the formal theories and legal technicalities of Soviet government, we concentrate on actual ways, means, and problems in the operation of the Soviet's "Party-Government" having in mind that we are interested in it as an element of Soviet national power.

## 3. Guide Lines of Discussion

a. What are the elements of strength and what are the elements of weakness in the Soviet system of government?

b. Are these elements peculiarly Soviet or peculiarly Communist or are they common to totalitarian, authoritarian regimes?

c. What are the attitudes of the Soviet people toward their government? Are they proud of it? Just resigned to it? Hopeful and eager to revolt against it?

d. Is the "collective leadership" which the Soviet press now talks about a fact or a facade?

e. Stalin's death tested the Party-Government system. What has this testing revealed?

4. Lecture

The formal lecture for the day is entitled THE REALITIES OF GOVERNMENT IN THE USSR, and will be delivered by

5. Reading

- a. MECHANICS OF A POLICE STATE, Smith, Chapter 6 from My Three Years in Moscow, 1949, p. 111-130.
- b. THE POLITICAL COHESIVENESS OF THE SOVIET SYSTEM, Fainsod, Chapter 17 from How Russia is Ruled, 1953, p. 477-500.

FIFTH DAY  
FRIDAY, 7 JANUARY

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SOVIET PLANNED ECONOMY

1. Introduction

a. Before we can profitably begin a consideration of Soviet economic strengths and weaknesses we need at least a smattering of information about the Soviet economic system especially because it is unique in many respects. "Planned economy" has many meanings both objectively and in the mind of the hearer or user of the phrase. To some, the phrase connotes security and a better life; to others, loss of freedom, loss of strength, and eventual degeneration or defeat. Objectively, there are many differences in degree or in kind between the "planned economies" of, for example, the U.K., Sweden, and the USSR.

b. The Soviet system of "planned economy" is sui generis, or at least, was so until its extension into the satellites and, in a modified form, into China. Today it has become the pattern for the Communist bloc and is being examined with sympathetic interest by various uncommitted states.

c. The USSR has a highly centralized form of economic organization in which the collectivist theory of agricultural production is combined with the planned development of industry. Since theoretically, and to a considerable extent in practice, the market and other economic controls which operate under capitalism and are not operative under the Soviet system, other controls have had to be devised and used. The Soviet program, of course, is aimed at very rapid industrialization and almost complete economic self-sufficiency.

## 2. Scope of Topic

We consider today the main structural elements of Soviet economy--what the Five Year Plans are, how they are made and used; the financing of economic expansion; the use of the labor force; and the relationships of industry, trade, and agriculture.

## 3. Guide Lines of Discussion

- a. Considering the Kremlin's aims for economic development, are the Five-Year Plans effective?
  - b. Would you say that Soviet economic successes have been achieved because of their system or in spite of it?
  - c. Why do some "underdeveloped" peoples, especially in Asia, find the Soviet way of economic development attractive?
  - d. What is the nub of the Soviet's agricultural problem?
  - e. What "capitalistic practices," theoretically absent, are actually used by the Soviet system?
  - f. What are the real meanings and implications of Stakhanovism?
4. There will be no formal lecture on this topic. It will, however, be considered in the regular discussion groups.

## 5. Reading

- a. Excerpts from Russia's Soviet Economy (1954) as follows:  
"The Planning System" (pp. 116-126), "Deficiencies of Soviet Statistics" (pp. 129-134), "The National Economic Plan," (pp. 146-160, 177-182).
- b. MAIN STREET USSR, by Arthur E. Adams, The New Leader, 9 August, 1954, pp. 12-16.

SIXTH DAY  
MONDAY, 10 JANUARY

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SOVIET ECONOMIC STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES

1. Introduction

a. With this topic we move into the second subdivision of our study of the Soviet Union, namely, into a consideration of current situations and indicated prospects. The final topic of the first week was on the general structure and function of the Soviet economy. This week begins with a survey of the current status of Soviet industry, agriculture and trade.

b. Soviet economic growth and accomplishments, especially since 1946, have been very impressive. There have been and still are soft spots and grave problems. High priority areas such as heavy machinery, strategic minerals, arms and armaments not only recovered war-time losses but also, in many cases had by 1950 already overtaken and surpassed the prewar levels of production. In the new field of atomic energy, resounding proof of progress was explosively demonstrated in 1949 and again thereafter.

c. One feature of this postwar growth was the dispersal of industrial growth. By 1952, for example, the Ukraine had recovered its prewar industrial levels but not its pre-1941 leadership. The Baku and Caucasus oil fields in like fashion became relatively less important as new fields were brought into production. (The Baku and Caucasus fields produced over 80% of the total petroleum output in 1940, less than 50% in 1951.)

d. Postwar economic development was uneven. Low priority areas, especially consumer goods, lagged badly. So did agriculture as Khrushchev<sup>"</sup> revealed in 1953 when he announced that industrial production

had increased by 230% between 1940 and 1952 while agricultural production had increased only 10% in the same period.

## 2. Scope of Topic

Attention today is concentrated on the current accomplishments and problems of the Soviet economy with a glance also at future prospects.

## 3. Guide Lines of Discussion

a. Is the Soviet economy capable of supporting a major war? If not, is it likely to develop such capability in the near future?

b. How does current Soviet industrial output compare with that of western Europe? With the U. S.?

c. How important is the currently publicized emphasis upon consumer goods?

d. How important to the Soviet Union is East-West trade?

e. Why and to what degree in terms of overall national power is agriculture the sore spot of the Soviet Economy?

## 4. Lecture

The formal lecture for today is entitled SOVIET ECONOMIC STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES and will be delivered by

## 5. Reading

a. THE MALENKOV-KRUSHCHEV NEW ECONOMIC POLICY, by Lazar Volin, The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. LXII, No. 3 (June, 1954) pp. 187-209.

b. HOW BUSINESS GETS DONE IN RUSSIA, Fortune Magazine, February, 1953, pp. 122 & ff.

c. See, also, the classified reading list which is issued separately.

SEVENTH DAY  
TUESDAY, 11 JANUARY

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SOVIET SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL CAPABILITIES

1. Introduction

a. For many reasons, some of which were once sound but no longer are valid and some of which never had much basis in fact, the West has repeatedly underestimated Soviet scientific and technological capabilities. The once sound but no longer valid reasons include the observations made nearly a quarter of a century ago when the Soviets were just getting started on their modernization of their society. And among the reasons whose validity was always dubious at best was an emotional conviction of many that Poland's eastern borders marked the limits of culture and knowledge. Our cherished conviction that no scientific or other intellectual progress can be made except by free men contributed to our beliefs about Soviet backwardness in these lines. So did just plain wishful thinking which, along with lack of information and understanding, led us to over-emphasize the shortcomings and inefficiencies to which Soviet records themselves attested.

b. The Soviets' explosions of atomic and thermonuclear devices so much before we had expected such events shocked us into making re-evaluations. The shock, in fact, was so great that our judgments may have, pendulum-like, swung too far the other way. This is not certain, but it is certain that we can no longer afford complacency nor can we indulge safely in a belief that our superiority to Soviet science is somewhat automatic if not divinely ordained. This is now rather generally recognized by all responsible leaders.

c. It is less generally recognized that the Soviets have been winning friends and kudos in many parts of the world by displays of literary, esthetic,

and other accomplishments. The ballet, books--well printed and sold way below cost, films, sports, exhibits at trade fairs--all these "cultural" weapons are being used by our enemy with telling effect in many parts of the world, especially in some of the "In-Between Areas."

## 2. Scope of Topic

We are primarily concerned today with the current and future capabilities of Soviet science. This includes not only such military accomplishments as missiles, fission and fusion weapons but also such scientific tools as electronic computers and developments in pure research. Plans and progress in the training of scientists and technicians, and cultural capabilities will also be touched upon.

## 3. Guide Lines of Discussion

a. Most western scholars cherish a belief that scientific advances are possible only in conditions of full intellectual freedom. Is this belief sound? What are the implications for Soviet science?

b. How do the Soviets stand today in technical and scientific training as compared to their earlier situation, and as compared to the current U. S. situation?

c. What evidences are there of Soviet scientific advances?

d. Will Soviet scientific advance affect their position on disarmament?

e. Why are Soviet cultural achievements, for example, in literature and the arts particularly impressive to the Asiatic peoples?

f. Can we meet successfully this type of Soviet competition?

How best can we do so?

## 4. Lecture

The formal lecture for today is entitled SOVIET SCIENCE, 1954-19\_\_

5. Reading

- a. See also the classified reading list which is issued separately.
- b. PROFESSIONAL AND SCIENTIFIC PERSONNEL IN THE USSR, by Nicholas De Witt, Science, Vol. 120, No. 3105 (2 July, 1954), pp. 1-4.
- c. THE PROGRESS OF SOVIET SCIENCE, by John Purkevich, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 32, No. 3, (April, 1954) pp. 430-439.
- d. ACHIEVEMENTS AND TASKS OF THE NATURAL AND TECHNICAL SCIENCES, by A. Nesmayanov, Kommunist, No. 6 (April, 1954), translated in The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. VI, No. 27 (18 August, 1954) pp. 3-9 (Scan only).
- e. SOVIET CULTURAL COLLABORATION, The World Today, Vol. 10, No. 5 (May, 1954) pp. 197-209.
- f. THE "RIGHT TO KNOWLEDGE" IN THE SOVIET UNION, by Harold J. Berman, The Columbia Law Review, Vol. 54 (May, 1954) pp. 749-764.

EIGHTH DAY  
WEDNESDAY, 12 JANUARY

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SOVIET MILITARY CAPABILITIES, I

1. Introduction

a. It has been repeatedly observed that Communism has nowhere achieved a major success without the backing of strong military forces, or, at least, (as in the case of the coup in Czechoslovakia) of strong military power. This was true in Russia itself in the years immediately following the Bolshevik seizure of power in Petrograd (now Leningrad) in 1917. It was touch and go for the next three years as to whether the regime could survive in the face of both domestic opposition and foreign intervention. The newly developed Red Army of Workers and Peasants was a decisive factor in the Bolshevik-Communist victory, and it was also decisive in the Kremlin's conquest of Georgia, Siberia, the Ukraine and the western lands--a conquest which was the necessary prelude to the formation in 1924 of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Thereafter (1939-1940) Soviet military power was an active ingredient in the conquest and annexation of the Baltic states.

b. Since 1945 Soviet military forces or Soviet military power have played major roles in Soviet policy. The capture of the satellite countries; the maintenance of puppet regimes and the high degree of Soviet influence in world councils have all been based in great measure upon the military factor in Soviet power. Our own military and other commitments in Europe and the existence of NATO and the Paris and Brussels Pacts reflect our concern with Soviet military forces and capabilities. Whether we over-or under-estimate those capabilities, and whatever objective reality concerning them may be, we have thought of the Soviet forces as poised for a westward drive

and we have reacted to this thought.

c. We shall deal later with possible differences between objective reality and with what we have assumed the reality to be--i.e., with the question of the most probable Soviet courses of action. For today's and tomorrow's topics we accept the conventional assumptions without question in order to look first at whatever facts and opinions are current concerning Soviet military capabilities.

## 2. Scope of Topic

We concentrate our attention today on the broad view of current Soviet military strengths and weaknesses.

## 3. Guide Lines of Discussion

a. How have the Soviet rulers been able to maintain a substantial popular acquiescence in the large-scale assignment of national resources and production to military ends?

b. Have the Soviets been able to build matching capabilities, for example, between fission and fusion weapons and instruments for delivering such weapons?

c. What delivery instruments are known to be available to the Soviets?

d. Are the satellites a military asset or a military liability?

e. What appear to be the actual or potential weak spots in Soviet military capabilities?

f. What appear to be the areas of greatest capability in the Soviet war machine?

## 4. Lecture

The formal lecture for today is entitled SOVIET MILITARY STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES and will be delivered by

## 5. Reading

See the classified reading list which is issued separately.

NINTH DAY  
THURSDAY, 13 JANUARY

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SOVIET MILITARY CAPABILITIES, II

1. This is a continuation of the topic begun yesterday. The introduction, scope of topic, and guide lines for discussion are applicable to both days.
2. The formal lecture for today is entitled
3. Reading
  - a. See the classified reading list which is issued separately.

TENTH DAY  
FRIDAY, 14 JANUARY

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SOVIET STRATEGIC CONCEPTS

1. Introduction

a. Part of our task this year is to make critical examinations not only of judgments and decisions but also of the assumptions upon which such judgments rest. It appears that one assumption on which much high-level policy rests is that the Soviets have both the capability and the purpose of launching mass land, air, and, possibly, sea attacks against the West. This in turn assumes that the Soviet military leaders have been planning and preparing for such attacks; in short, that their strategic concepts hold such actions to be, under certain circumstances, proper, possible, and profitable to them.

b. There seems little reason seriously to doubt Soviet military capabilities in terms of manpower, weapons (including fission and fusion), and the fighting qualities of individual Soviet soldiers, sailors, and airmen. But when we move from capabilities to how they mean to use those capabilities we are confronted by a series of gravely significant questions, many of which we are unable to answer with any confidence and some of which we can scarcely answer at all. The easiest question concerns long-range intentions. Here it is abundantly clear that Moscow has always aimed at speeding the creation of a Communist world, at transforming the USSR into a World Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

c. Specific objectives on less than a global scale have also been frankly stated by Soviet leaders as witness, for example, the following typical Soviet pronouncement about Germany:

In order to ensure security in Europe, it is of decisive importance to settle the German problem. This means that the most important and urgent task is the restoration of the unity of Germany as a peace-loving and democratic state and the conclusion of a peace treaty .... It is the Soviet Government's view that there are possibilities for achieving agreement between the powers on this question if one admits the incontrovertible view that the main task is the reunion of Germany on peaceful and democratic foundations. [Soviet note of 23 October, 1954 suggesting a four-power conference on Germany. Emphasis added]

Since the Soviets reserve the description "peace-loving and democratic" for Communist-dominated nations, this ranks as a clear and flat statement of an intention to make Germany into a Soviet satellite.

d. When one seeks to discover Soviet concepts as to the strategies and tactics by which their intermediate and end goals are to be achieved, the picture becomes obscure. And when one looks for information concerning the concepts which might govern the thinking of high Soviet military leaders, large parts of the picture are simply blotted from our view. Are they thinking and planning in terms of massive strikes on the U. S. and Europe by their long-range air army? Are they thinking and planning in terms of a mass movement of armies westward into Europe? How do they mean to use their submarine and surface fleets--as commerce raiders? in support of amphibious operations? in offensive fleet action? in defensive fleet action?

e. Or, to approach the matter somewhat differently, does the Soviet high command think of itself as providing a deterrent to military aggression against the USSR or as supplying a military umbrella from under which overt and covert operations short of all-out war can be undertaken? These are but a few of the questions which readily spring to mind. They merit careful and continuing consideration even though definitive answers may be beyond our ken at this time.

2. Scope of Topic

Today's topic inquires into the strategic thinking and concepts which may be expected to guide the Soviet's use of their military capabilities.

3. Guide Lines of Discussion

- a. What indications are there that Soviet military planners mean to send large land forces westward into Europe?
- b. What indications are there that Soviet military planners plan to mount an all-out air attack upon the United States and/or Western Europe?
- c. Are there any significant indications of how and where Soviet planners intend to use the large number of submarines they are reported to have?
- d. Is it possible that Soviet military planners are thinking less in terms of an active, mass offensive and more in terms of a force in being which can threaten and simultaneously serve also to defend? Is such thinking not only possible but also probable?
- e. What can be deduced about Soviet strategic concepts and purposes from the history of Soviet actions in World War II?
- f. What can be deduced about possible and probable Soviet strategic concepts and purposes from the history of the Communist forces in Korea?

4. Lecture

The formal lecture for today will deal with SOVIET STRATEGIC CONCEPTS. It will be delivered by Mr. Allen Dulles, Director, Central Intelligence Agency.

5. Reading

- a. HOW WEAK IS RUSSIA, excerpts from the book Close Contact (1954) by Brigadier General C. H. Dewhurst, printed in U. S. News and World Report, p. 62-69.
- b. SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE, Part I, p. 9-62 by R. L. Garthoff.
- c. RUSSIANS ARE NOT FORTY FEET TALL, By James D. Wilmoth, Military Review, Vol. XXXIV, No. 7 (October, 1954) pp. 3-8.

ELEVENTH DAY  
MONDAY, 17 JANUARY

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CHANGES SINCE STALIN

1. Introduction

a. It has been almost two years since Stalin's death and during that time numerous changes have taken place both in Soviet domestic affairs and in Soviet foreign policies. Many of these changes have been no more than superficial and some which have been publicized as major innovations turn out on closer inspection to be not new but only returns to earlier practices. The so-called doctrine of collective leadership, for example, is not a post-Stalin invention. Lenin talked and sometimes practiced "collective leadership" in the early days of his regime. Similarly, the use of foreign trade (or the promise of it) as an instrument of foreign policy also dates back to Lenin's time.

b. It would be silly to suggest, however, that no changes have taken place. There is a new tactical flexibility in the Presidium's dealings both with their own people and with foreign nations. A playing down of terrorism and a simultaneous playing up of methods of persuasion are cases in point on the domestic side. So, also, were the admissions of failures and shortages in agriculture and in the production of consumer goods--such admissions being balanced by promises of improvement and, to some degree, by actions designed to bring improvements. In the field of foreign relations, the Soviet's new approach was characterized by better manners and more sugar-coating as well as by such things as the "normalization" (the Soviet's word for it) of their relations with Tito.

c. Repeated mentions, both by Communist and non-Communist commentators

of "new" policies, "new" actions and post-Stalin "changes" seem to be having a cumulative effect and one which is not so intended by the non-Communist group. Non-Communist readers (or hearers) may and probably do ~~reject or~~ heavily discount particular reports of change, but repetition can leave a residue even among non-believers--a point fully recognized and steadily exploited by writers of advertising slogans. It is not amiss, therefore, to remind ourselves that none of the post-Stalin developments have changed either the basic doctrines or the end goals of the Presidium. Their fundamental guide-to-action has not been altered and they remain dedicated to our destruction.

## 2. Scope of Topic

Today's topic is chronologically limited to the past twenty-two months. Its subject matter, though touching both domestic and foreign affairs, is primarily political and economic.

## 3. Guide Lines of Discussion

a. The much publicized increase in consumer goods will still leave the average Soviet citizen deficient in ordinary items such as radios, home appliances, bicycles, etc. What, then, were the probable purposes of this "new" policy?

b. Has the position of the various minority groups in the USSR been significantly altered since Stalin's death?

c. Judging from the changes made or promised what are the Presidium's major domestic worries?

d. What effects, if any, has the Soviet "new look" in foreign affairs had upon U. S. policies and actions?

e. What evidence is there, if any, that this "new look" has been profitable to the USSR?

f. Is there any chance that the Presidium may find itself unwittingly proving the truth of de Tocqueville's observation that the most dangerous moment for a bad government is when it begins to reform?

4. Lecture

The formal lecture for today is entitled SOME POST-STALIN DEVELOPMENTS IN THE USSR. It will be delivered by

5. Reading

- a. THE RETURN TO STALINISM, by Boris I. Nicolaevsky, The New Leader, 19 April, 1954, pp. 3-5.
- b. THE BIG SIX OF SOVIET RUSSIA, by Harry Schwartz, The New York Times Magazine, 10 January, 1954, pp. 13&ff.
- c. THE RETREAT FROM STALINISM by Richard Lowenthal, Twentieth Century, Vol. 154 (Jy-Dec. 1953). pp. 414-425.
- d. THE SOVIET UNION SINCE STALIN, by Merle Fainsod, Problems of Communism, Vol. 3, no. 2 (March/April, 1954) pp 1-10.

TWELFTH DAY  
TUESDAY, 18 JANUARY

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THE SATELLITES SINCE STALIN

1. Introduction

a. We have concluded that portion of this particular course which is devoted to the study of the USSR, main power base of Soviet Communism. We move now to a brief consideration of the captive states or satellites, which form either a series of buffer states for the defense of the USSR or as points d'appui for further Soviet aggression--or both.

b. By January, 1946, a Soviet-dominated, Communist government was solidly in the saddle in Albania. Rumania and Bulgaria were added as satellites in November, 1946; Poland in January, 1947; Czechoslovakia in February, 1948; and East Germany in October of 1950. The three Baltic States had been annexed just before World War II; parts of East Prussia and Bessarabia were added in the closing months of that conflict. The pattern of conquest varied somewhat, but the end result was, in all cases, complete domination. In all cases, also, it is apparent that Soviet preparations for the take-overs long ante-dated World War III. Many preparatory moves, including the training in Moscow of native puppet rulers, had been successfully made. Soviet actions during the war, especially in its final months, were aimed at achieving or completing the long planned-for conquests. Postwar actions have successfully consolidated the Soviet hold on their newly-won empire.

2. Scope of Topic

Today's topic is limited to a rapid survey of major internal developments and general conditions in the satellites today.

### 3. Guide Lines of Discussion

a. What were the significant results and implications of the 1953 uprisings in East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia?

b. What is the status of organized religions in the satellites?

Is it reasonable to expect anti-Communist leadership from any of their clergy?

c. What has happened to living standards in the satellites?

d. Have satellite governments solved the land problems? What is the current status of the peasantry?

e. To what degree and with what success has Moscow tried to achieve the cultural integration of the satellites with the USSR?

f. Is there really any post-Stalin "new look" in the satellites?

If so, what is it and what does it signify?

### 4. Lecture

The formal lecture for this day is entitled DOMESTIC SITUATIONS IN THE SATELLITES and will be delivered by

### 5. Reading

a. EASTERN EUROPE SINCE STALIN, by Hugh Seton-Watson, Problems of Communism, Vol. 3, No. 2 (March-April 1954), pp. 10-17.

b. MOSCOW'S NEW COURSE, The Twentieth Century, Vol. CLV, No. 925 (March, 1954) pp. 208-217.

c. POLITICS AND ECONOMIES IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA, The World Today, Vol. 10, No. 8 (August, 1954) pp. 356-366.

d. SATELLITE STATES IN THE POST-STALIN ERA, by Godfrey Lecis, International Affairs, Vol. XXX. No. 1 (January, 1954) pp. 40-49.

e. POLAND, The Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 194, No. 1 (July, 1954) pp. 12-14.

f. THE STALINISATION OF EASTERN EUROPE, Hugh Seton-Watson, Chapter 13 from his book, From Lenin to Malenkov, (1953) pp. 248-270.

THIRTEENTH DAY  
WEDNESDAY, 19 JANUARY

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MILITARY AND ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE SATELLITES

1. Introduction

a. Yesterday we were concerned with the general domestic situations in the satellite states. This would be of little moment to us were it not for the fact that the satellites add to the strength (and also to the problems of the USSR). It has been the Soviet purpose not only to maintain the satellites as political dependents, but also to integrate them into the Soviet system.

b. The early days of Soviet control over the satellites saw what can fairly be described as the outright looting of these countries to supply the "tools of production" as well as raw materials and finished goods directly to the USSR. Outright confiscation was gradually and for the most part replaced with slightly more subtle methods, but the end result was essentially the same.

c. In the strictly military field there are many well-grounded reports that the satellite armed forces have been or are still being transformed into ancillaries under direct Soviet command. Weapons and equipment also have been made literally interchangeable among the satellite forces and between them and the Soviet armed forces, except that the Soviets have not shared their most modern and effective equipment with their satellites. It may be noted, for example, that the Soviets have been very loathe to supply jet planes to their satellites. When such planes have been supplied, very rigorous security and control systems have been instituted. This strongly suggests that the Soviets may have considerable doubts about the reliability of the

satellite forces. However though such troops probably would not be used in forward areas or in attack roles, they have been screened and would probably be a value as line of communication troops, in civil defense roles and as a gendarmerie to police the local populace.

## 2. Scope of Topic

Attention today is limited chiefly to the integration of the economic and military systems of the satellites into those of the USSR. Overall evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of the Communist Bloc are specifically excluded because they will form the subject of later consideration.

## 3. Guide Lines of Discussion

- a. What were the patterns of Soviet seizure of power in the satellites?
- b. What are the principal military contributions of the satellites to the USSR? Economic contributions?
- c. How do you account for the fact that Soviet policy has shifted from outright looting to more subtle exploitation of the satellites?
- d. What advantage can we take during the cold war of opposition within the satellites to the USSR? In case of a hot war?
- e. What action should we take in case of uprisings such as that in East Germany in 1953?
- f. What are the problems created for the USSR by the existence of its satellite empire?

## 4. Lecture

The formal lecture for this day is entitled "THE MILITARY POTENTIAL OF THE SATELLITES" and will be delivered by

## 5. Reading

- a. TRANSFORMATION IN EASTERN EUROPE, by X, The Australian Outlook, Vol. 5, No. 3 (September, 1951) pp. 149-157.

- b. METHODS OF SOVIET DOMINATION IN THE SATELLITE STATES, by Bedrich Bruegel, International Affairs, Vol. XXVII, No. 1 (January 1951) pp. 32-37.
- c. TO FIGHT FOR RUSSIA, Foreign Report, 18 December 1952, pp. 3-5.
- d. GERMANS UNDER THE GOS PLAN, The Economist 5 September, 1953, pp. (NWC reprint 12,4118, IV, '53).
- e. THE SATELLITE'S LINKED ECONOMIES and SOVIET ECONOMIC STRANGLE HOLD, The Economist, 30 May 1953, pp. 608-610 and 20 June 1953, pp. 824-826.
- f. See, also, the classified reading list which is issued separately.

FOURTEENTH DAY  
THURSDAY, 20 JANUARY

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THE GROWTH OF COMMUNISM IN CHINA

1. Introduction

a. Having surveyed the characteristics, strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet Union and its satellites, we turn to an analysis of the only other major power in the Communist Bloc--Red China. The seizure of China by the Communists was a disastrous blow to the Free World. The ultimate effect of that on the balance of power is still not clear. The Chinese Communists are vigorously attempting to revolutionize China, politically, economically, socially and militarily. It is essential to understand both their objectives and their capabilities.

b. Traditional China was a decentralized autocracy and a civil-oriented society, where an amazing degree of stability had been developed despite extremely low standards of living. Provincial feelings were strong, but the basic loyalty was to the family, rather than to the nation. The state was administered by an elite bureaucracy in which civil officials had greater prestige than their military colleagues. However, after the mid-nineteenth century the impact of the modern West began to break down the old order. In 1912 the dynasty was overthrown and China lapsed into a period of disintegrating warlordism. Considerable order was brought out of this chaos by the Nationalist Government from 1928 until World War II. Then by 1949, China fell under the despotism of the Communist party.

c. The Chinese Communist Party was organized in 1920 by a handful of individuals. At that time they were motivated largely by the chaotic internal conditions and by the failure of China to react effectively to the challenge of

the modern West. Three years later, on orders from Moscow, the Communists allied with the larger Nationalist Party in hopes of jointly achieving power and then subverting their allies. In 1927 this marriage of convenience split asunder. Henceforth, with the exception of a period of uneasy association during World War II the two parties were in conflict. By 1937 the Communist forces had been seriously reduced and driven into the barren hills of Northwest China.

d. It was war with Japan between 1937 and 1945 that so drastically altered the situation, giving the Communists their greatest opportunity. The Japanese invasion broke up the best nationalist armies, forced the Government to transfer to the backward hinterland, cut foreign trade and vital customs revenues to a trickle, and produced a demoralizing inflation. Having borrowed their ideology and tactics of revolution from Soviet Union, they added embellishments and tailored their strategy to meet the desires of the Chinese people. The Red leaders made effective use of all the great appeals of Asia: nationalism, anti-imperialism, the desire for higher standards of living and the longing for peace. Seeking to isolate the Government, they promised something to almost every class of society, including the native capitalists. In their efforts the Chinese Communists were greatly assisted by the tactical experience and indirect arms aid furnished by the Soviet Union.

e. The Communists fought the Nationalist Government on political, economic, and psychological, as well as military levels. Yet, in the final analysis military force was the determining factor. The Chinese Red Army won for the party.

## 2. Scope of Topic

Today we will discuss the development of Communism in China, with emphasis on the principal tactics and techniques used by the Communists. Maoism and the

degree of doctrinal and tactical originality of the Chinese Reds will be analyzed.

### 3. Guide Lines of Discussion

- a. To what extent is Communism in China patterned after Soviet Communism? Is there a sufficient degree of originality to justify the term "Maoism?"
- b. What do you consider to be the principal policies and tactics which permitted the Communists to seize power in China?
- c. Are there any indications of internal cleavages within the Chinese Communist Party? If so, can we take advantage of them?
- d. How is the "strategy of success" developed in China being applied by the Communists to other areas of the Far East? What can we do to counteract this?
- e. What appears to be the actual relationship between Red China and Russia? Is Communist China a satellite or an ally?
- f. What are the principal ties which bind Red China to the USSR. What are the actual or potential sources of friction? Can the latter be exploited?

### 4. Lecture

The formal lecture for this day is entitled THE GROWTH OF CHINESE COMMUNISM and will be delivered by

### 5. Reading

- a. CHINESE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS and CHINESE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS, a reprint from China, Japan and the Powers by Cameron, McReynolds and Mahoney, p. 35-56.
- b. POLITICAL FERMENT IN CHINA, 1911-1951, by E. H. Prichard and THE HEGEMONY OF THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS 1945-1950, by G. E. Taylor, in Report on China, The Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science, September 1951, p. 1-21.
- c. COMMUNISM IN CHINA, in the Strategy of Tactics of World Communism, 80th Congress, Government Printing Office, 1949, p. 6-36.

FIFTEENTH DAY  
FRIDAY, 21 JANUARY

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THE ECONOMY OF COMMUNIST CHINA

1. Introduction

a. During the last hundred years China has been exposed with growing intensity to modern industry and technology. Yet China, unlike Japan, failed to become an industrial power. There is no consensus of all of the reasons involved, but the following factors had an important influence: the political, economic and social structure of traditional China mitigated against the creation of wide-spread industry. The prestige of official office drew men of talent into government service, rather than into business. The merchant, considered to be a parasite, was officially placed at the bottom of the social scale. Largely unregulated taxation and the absence of a commercial code greatly handicapped the entrepreneur. There was no sanctity of contract and the concept of a corporation as a legal entity did not exist. Since businesses were operated as family firms, nepotism took precedence over efficiency. The heritage of government monopolies limited private initiative, as did the controls of the craft guilds. The prestige of land ownership, as well as the profits to be derived from short term loans, decreased the credit available for long term industrial investments. Internal disorders, rebellions, poor communications and the localized nature of markets also hindered industrialization. Poverty was so widespread that it restricted purchasing power.

b. Since the establishment of the Republic in 1912 commercial codes have been promulgated and industrialization has been given greater

official encouragement, but many of its traditional barriers, although weakened, continue to exist. Also, since 1912 the cost and disruption of wars and civil wars have seriously handicapped economic development. Japan by investing over two billion dollars built a sizable industrial complex in Manchuria and there was a gradual growth of industry in China proper. Much of this, however, was destroyed or damaged during World War II.

c. China is still a vast, technologically backward, agricultural nation. The great majority of the people are peasants working on the land and only a small percent of the national production is accounted for by industry of all types. There exists a severe shortage of capital, managerial skills, trained technicians, skilled labor, and several basic materials.

d. Nevertheless, the principal economic objective of the Communists is the forced draft industrialization of China. They are aggressively seeking to attain this goal by a series of five year plans, which, as in the Soviet Union, emphasize the development of heavy industries and collectivized agriculture at the expense of consumers goods. The Communists have an advantage over the past, since they will ruthlessly muster all of the controls of a police state to force their objective. If they preserve peace and stability they may make considerable industrial progress, as has the USSR. However, they face gigantic obstacles, both natural and party-made.

e. By her internal policies and by her aggression in Korea Communist China has cut herself off from large scale trade with the Free World Bloc. The only other major source of capital goods for industrialization is the Soviet Empire. There is considerable doubt that Russia desires to help create a great industrialized China on her borders and, although

the USSR has granted aid with considerable fanfare, she has done so in rather niggardly amounts.

## 2. Scope of Topic

After briefly surveying the present status of Red China's economy, this topic will outline the economic policies and the first five-year plan of the Chinese Communists.

## 3. Guide Lines of Discussion

a. What are the principal economic policies and objectives of the Chinese Communists?

b. Does China have the essential requirements to become a great industrial power?

c. What are the main economic problems and weaknesses of China? Which of these weaknesses might the Communists be able to rectify without extensive aid to hasten the industrialization of China?

d. Does it appear likely that within the foreseeable future Communist China will develop the industrial base necessary to become militarily self-sufficient?

e. Does it appear likely or reasonable that Russia will provide extensive aid to hasten the industrialization of China?

f. There is pressure by Britain and Japan to increase their trade with Red China, the argument being that it is more beneficial to them than to the Communists. Is this agreement sound?

## 4. Lecture

The formal lecture for this day is entitled "THE ECONOMIC PLANS AND POLICIES OF THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS" and will be delivered by

5. Reading

- a. THE WORKING OF COMMUNIST CHINA'S FIVE YEAR PLAN, by R. M. Rogge in Pacific Affairs, March, 1954, p. 16-24.
- b. THE CONTROL OF INDUSTRIAL LABOR IN COMMUNIST CHINA, by A. W. Shurcliff, in U. S. Department of Commerce, Monthly Labor Review, August 1953, p. 821-825.
- c. CHINA'S AGRICULTURE (Slow Boat to Collectivization and Tasks for the Transition) in The Economist, February 27, 1954 and March 13, 1954, p. 619, 621, 782, 785.
- d. COMMUNIST CHINA AND TRADE WITH THE WEST, by Yuan-li Wu, in Pacific Spectator, Autumn, 1953, p. 404-418.

SIXTEENTH DAY  
MONDAY, 24 JANUARY

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THE FOREIGN POLICIES OF COMMUNIST CHINA

1. Introduction.

a. On the internal scene, according to their own statements, the Chinese Communists plan to move toward the establishment of a completely socialized state. Unfortunately, this dogmatic ideological goal appears to be tempered in part by realism. Although the nationalization of trade and industry are proceeding more rapidly than was often expected, the explosive question of collectivization of the land is being dealt with more cautiously. In some degree the Chinese Red leaders seem to be profiting from the earlier lessons and mistakes of the Soviet Union.

b. Certain facets of Chinese civilization, including the heritage of authoritarian rule and administration by an "elite," as well as the modern desire for national prestige, should be capable of exploitation by the Communists. Other characteristics, such as the loyalty to family above state or party, nepotism, the humanistic tradition of Confucianism, and the two thousand year old background of private ownership, should create serious obstacles for Communist planners. Despite close ideological ties with the USSR, it can be assumed that Communism in China will vary somewhat from Russian Communism owing to internal variations beyond the control of even the most ruthless Communist leaders.

c. Externally, Communist ideology, historical claims and national ambitions combine to encourage aggressive expansion by Red China. The Chinese Empire at one time or another claimed nearly all of the Far East and Southeast Asia as tributary states. These historic interests may be

revived as a justification for territorial aggrandizement. The Communist leaders see as their goal the ultimate world victory of Communism. Thus their ideology furnishes another rational for imperialism.

d. Aside from her own ambitions there are some indications that by agreement with Moscow the expansionist program of the Communist Bloc in the Far East will be directed through Peking. Throughout East and South Asia the Communists are using the tactics and techniques of seizing power that they developed in China. Constantly they employ propaganda, infiltration and the organization of native communist parties. They have supported guerrilla operations and sabotage in Indo-China and Malaya. They may be expected to infiltrate Indonesia, Burma and Thailand. In all Southeast Asia, they are attempting, with some success, to exploit the important Chinese minorities. In the case of Korea they openly invaded with large Chinese forces. The Chinese Communist leaders have occupied Tibet and have sworn to seize Formosa. Mao Tse-tung has even spoken of "liberating" India. In conjunction with the USSR, Red China is dangling political and economic concessions in front of Japan and is stirring up anti-Americanism there. Alone, Communist China would not be a major threat to the United States. The real danger lies in her alliance with the Soviet Union.

## 2. Scope of Topic

Today we will discuss the major internal conditions and policies of Communist China, as well as the principal objectives and tactics of her expansion in Asia.

## 3. Guide Lines of Discussion

a. What appears to be the main lines of Red China's foreign policy? What are the tactics and techniques by which Communist China seeks to extend her influence in Asia?

b. What do you consider to be most feasible means of preventing further expansion by Red China? of rolling it back?

c. How effective can we expect SEATO to be in countering Communist expansion in Southern Asia?

d. Do you expect Communism in China to be the same as, a slight variation of, or a drastic modification of Russian Communism?

e. Can Communism basically alter "unchanging China"?

f. What would you expect the prospects of Titoism to be in Red China?

#### 4. Lecture

The formal lecture for this day is entitled "CHINESE COMMUNIST FOREIGN POLICY" and will be delivered by

#### 5. Reading

a. CHINA AND THE WORLD, by Tillman Durdin, Headline Series (May-June 1953) p. 3-21.

b. CHINA'S AGRARIAN REFORMERS, by Father Mark Tennien, New York Herald Tribune, Sect. 7, January 11, 1953, p. 8-9, 26.

c. CHINA'S WINTER OF DISCONTENT? The Economist, Oct 31, 1953, p. 339-340.

d. THE NATIONAL CONSTITUTION OF COMMUNIST CHINA, by Chao Kuo-chun, Far Eastern Survey, October 1954, p. 145-151.

e. CHINA'S ROAD TO SOCIALISM, The Economist, October 9, 1954, p. 105-107.

SEVENTEENTH DAY  
TUESDAY, 25 JANUARY

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THE MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF COMMUNIST CHINA

1. Introduction

a. The effectiveness of the Chinese Red Army came as a grim shock when its troops attacked the UN forces in Korea. The Western World had suffered from serious myths and illusions concerning China's military potential. It was widely believed that the Chinese were pacifically inclined and militarily incompetent. During the last century Chinese troops have often drawn scorn and derision. China's military posture has been drastically weakened by industrial backwardness, political decentralization, opposition to change and a shortage of professionally qualified leadership. Nevertheless, for half a century competent military observers have maintained that when well trained, equipped and led, the Chinese peasant is a first class soldier. The Communists appreciate the advantages of an effective army to a dictatorship, and they have made their greatest progress in the exploitation of their human resources--the peasant soldiers. Also, they are feverishly attempting to remove the obstacles which prevent China from being militarily self-sufficient.

b. The Chinese Red Army was first organized in 1927 and since that time the Communist leaders have sought to create a highly indoctrinated army, loyal to the Party. Many of the senior officers have experienced over twenty years of combat, but until the late 1940's most of the experience of the Red Army was in guerrilla operations. The Communist troops were skilled at maneuver, concealment, night operations and deception. They were capable of long marches and could exist on as little as any troops in the world, but

they were short of heavy equipment, specialized services and technically trained personnel. In Korea they were furnished modern equipment by the Soviet Union and gained two and a half years of experience in conventional warfare at the expense of the UN forces. During the campaigns the characteristics mentioned above were again demonstrated, but also, with Russian aid they improved their employment of heavy weapons and made some progress in the development of special and technical services. On the other hand, the widespread use of political commissars appears to have limited the initiative of unit commanders. Although the interdiction of enemy supply lines by the UN air forces may largely explain the reason, the Chinese logistical system proved incapable of long maintaining a major offensive after a break-through was achieved. Also, the Red leaders are still plagued by illiteracy and lack of sufficient technical training among their troops. The surrender rate among the Chinese was not high, but a very large percent of those who were captured refused to return to the Communists. This would indicate that with the rapid expansion of the Red Army after their victory in China, the Communists had not been able to effectively indoctrinate and win over the loyalty of all of their forces.

c. Communist China now possesses massive land armies capable of exerting great pressure against her ill-prepared neighbors to the south. However, the lack of adequate naval and air forces make her less of a threat to nations protected by wide water barriers.

d. Red China's major military weakness lies in the fact that she is so dependent on the USSR for heavy weapons and equipment of all types and for all services. Unless Communist China can become militarily self-sufficient, Russia will maintain this strangle hold over her ally and Red China will not be a great military power in her own name.

## 2. Scope of Topic

The purpose of this topic is to evaluate the current strengths and weaknesses of Red China's armed forces, with emphasis on the techniques the Communists are using to strengthen their military posture.

## 3. Guide Lines of Discussion

a. Considering the scorn in which the Chinese armed forces have often been held, how do you account for the current military strength of China?

b. Both armies were tapping the same manpower resources. How do you account for the differences in effectiveness and morale between the Nationalist and Communist armies during the last years civil war?

c. How great a threat are the forces of Red China to the continental states of Asia? to the island nations?

d. How effective a force is the Chinese Red Army for the defense of China from external invasion?

e. To what degree is China's military strength dependent on Soviet equipment and advice?

f. Can Communist China rapidly strengthen her military posture?

## 4. Lecture

The formal lecture for this day is entitled THE CHINESE COMMUNIST ARMY and will be delivered by

## 5. Reading

Handbook on the Communist Army, September 1952, p. 7-63, 119, 122-123.

EIGHTEENTH DAY  
WEDNESDAY, 26 JANUARY

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COMMUNIST STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES

1. Introduction

a. We have now completed our general survey of Communist China, and will conclude this course by returning briefly to the general consideration of World Communism. Today's topic, in other words, is the final sub-section of the first element of the course. Its aim is to set up a preliminary balance sheet of the strengths and weaknesses of the Communist Bloc.

b. When the last Party Congress met in October, 1952 Stalin closed the session with an exultant boast. Speaking of the Soviet Communist Party's "honored role" as the "'shock brigade' of the world revolutionary and workers' movement", Stalin said:

Of course, it was very hard to fill this honored role while the 'shock brigade' was the one and only one and as long as it had to fill this vanguard role almost single-handed. But that was in the past. Now things are quite different. Now, when new 'shock brigades' have appeared in the form of countries of peoples' democracies from China and Korea to Czechoslovakia and Hungary -- now it has become easier for our party to fight, yes, and the work goes more merrily.

His hearers greeted Stalin's statement with, as the official record says, "Stormy, prolonged applause." In this case, there is no reason to doubt the record. The increase in Communist power since 1917 has been tremendous; even since 1945; it has been considerable.

c. The most spectacular aspect of Communist strength is its combination of a vast land area, a huge supply of people, and very large armed forces. All these are, so to speak, only one side of the power base of Communism. The other side is a conspiratorial, "secular-religious" movement which has its disciplined

and devoted adherents in every country in the world. All these several elements of strength have been regarded during the past few weeks, and will be under review during the weeks to come.

d. Mention has also been made, from time to time, of certain and of possible weaknesses within the Communist Bloc. These, too, will come under later review. Suffice it now to say that there are cracks apparent in the allegedly monolithic structure of the Communist Bloc. How deep they run is a question to which we have no sure answer. But the following, partial list both indicates their presence and exemplifies their nature. Communist successes, as well as blunders, miscalculations, and ruthlessness have so aroused the Free World that it is today better prepared to defend itself than it used to be. This, in turn, places ever greater strains and demands upon the Communist machine which is, in many significant ways, cumbersome and relatively inefficient at best. The Communist bosses must keep their peoples operating under high tension and cumulative fatigue must be a factor. The demands of the USSR often collide with the needs and desires of the satellites, which, though now under Moscow's thumb, remain "unreliable" as the rigidity of continuing control measures attest. Likewise, there are at least potential if not actually current sources of friction between the Soviet Union and its junior partner, Communist China. And there are rivalries, both current and potential, among the top Party bosses themselves.

## 2. Scope of Topic

Today's topic seeks to evaluate data already in hand rather than to introduce new data. The process, however, should be suggestive of new interpretations or of new questions to test and consider.

## 3. Guide Lines of Discussion

a. What are the principal military strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet Bloc?

b. From the standpoint of fighting the cold war, are the totalitarian, bureaucratic governments of the Soviet Bloc an advantage or a disadvantage? In case of a hot war?

c. Does the Soviet Bloc appear to have greater long run solidarity than the Free World?

d. What would be the effect on the Western Communist Parties, and hence on Communist solidarity, of Mao tse-tung should he be recognized as the leading Communist theorist?

e. Does it appear that the Soviet Bloc will be able to rectify rapidly its basic weaknesses?

f. In regard to Communist strengths, does there come a point of diminishing returns where increased manpower becomes a liability rather than an asset?

#### 4. Lecture

The formal lecture for this day is entitled "OVER-ALL STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE COMMUNIST BLOC" and will be delivered by

#### 5. Reading

- a. SOVIET POWER IN 1960, by Edward Crankshaw, World, Vol. 1, No. 9 (March, 1954) pp. 20-23
- b. CAN RUSSIA TRUST HER SLAVE ARMIES?, by Charles W. Thayer, Saturday Evening Post, 7 August, 1954, pp. 30 & ff.
- c. THE SECRET OF KREMLIN WARFARE, by M.M. Green and J. Z. Kornfeder, U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 80, No. 10 (October, 1954) pp. 1131-1141.

NINETEENTH DAY  
THURSDAY, 27 JANUARY

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COMMITTEE PROBLEM PRESENTATIONS

Selected solutions to the Course Problem (See Section C of this booklet) will be presented by the student committees who prepared them to the entire class in the auditorium.

TWENTIETH DAY  
FRIDAY, 28 JANUARY

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SEMINAR

Student committees will be assigned to seminar groups in accordance with a schedule to be issued separately. In each group the several approaches to the Course Six Committee problem will be represented. Each group will conduct a full discussion of the problem and the solutions reported to the class in the presentations of the day before. This will provide an opportunity for expression of all points of view and enable the members of the class to hear as many of these as possible.